The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over spacelike intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann. * This work is supported in part by the
Shimony and Stein [1] have raised a question about an essential claim made in my 1997 paper [2] . I begin by explaining the claim, and the question they raised.
Lines 1 through 5 of my proof [2] show that under certain explicitly stated conditions the statement
is true, while lines 6 through 14 of that proof show that under these same conditions the statement
is false. Shimony and Stein arrive at the same conclusion-namely that (1) is true and (2) is false-under similar conditions. I then claim that this fact, that (1) is true and (2) is false, entails that information must sometimes be transferred over space-like intervals. Shimony and Stein question this claim, and suggest that one must make a hidden-variable assumption, as was done in Bell's theorems [3, 4] , in order to arrive at this strong conclusion. This issue is important, because all the assumptions used my proof are elements of orthodox quantum philosophy, and hence my claim, if valid, means that the precepts of orthodox quantum philosophy entail that information must sometimes be transferred over spacelike intervals. That conclusion is far stronger than what is proved by Bell's theorem [3] , and its usual generalizations [4, 5] , and it seems to have profound implications for development of relativistic quantum theory.
To provide an adequate foundation for the discussion I need to explain the meanings of (1) and (2), the assumptions that go into my proof that (1) is true and (2) is false, and the technical differences between my assumptions and those of Shimony and Stein.
The conditions under which I prove that (1) is true and (2) is false are these:
A. The choices made by the experimenters in each of the two regions R and L about which experiment will be performed in that region can be treated as free choices, or free variables.
B. There is at least one Lorentz frame of reference, call it LF, such that if in that frame every point of the spacetime region L is earlier than every point in the spacetime region R then for any experiment freely chosen and performed in the earlier region L the outcome that appears to observers in that region can be taken to be independent of which experiment will be freely chosen and performed later in the region R: the universe can be regarded as evolving forward in time in LF and, in particular, there is no action of a free choice made later in R upon an outcome that has already appeared earlier in L. This assumption is called LOC1.
C. No matter which experiments are freely chosen and performed, the predictions of quantum theory will be satisfied.
These assumptions are, I believe, compatible with the precepts of orthodox quantum thinking, and are, in a broad sense, entailed by them.
Notice that the truth of certain very special contrary-to-fact assertions is entailed by these assumptions. In particular, if the set of possible worlds is limited by conditions A, B, and C then, SF: For any possible world W , the following statement is true: If the situation in W is such that 1. The Hardy experimental conditions are satisfied, 2. Experiment L2 is freely chosen and performed in L, 3. Experiment R2 is freely chosen and performed in R, and 4. The outcome L2+ appears in L, then in any possible world W ′ that is the same as world W except for possible consequences choosing and performing in region R the experiment R1, instead of the experiment chosen and performed in R in world W , the outcome in the earlier region L is L2+.
The result asserted by SF is immediately entailed by the stated assump-tions, actually just A and B, and it is expressed symbolically as
This statement asserts, in brief, that if the theoretical conditions A, B, and C are satified then freely choosing and performing R1, instead of R2, in the later region R, leaves the earlier outcome in L undisturbed.
Similarly, the symbolic statement (1) asserts that, under the three conditions A, B, and C, if experiment L2 is freely chosen and performed in the earlier region L then a certain statement SR is true, whereas statement (2) makes the same claim under condition L1. Thus the conjunction of the facts that (1) is true and (2) is false implies that the truth of statement SR depends nontrivially on which of the two alternative possible experiments, L1 or L2, is freely chosen and performed in the space-time region L.
The statement SR just mentioned is represented symbolically by
It is an assertion about a possible world W , and it states SR: If in the possible world W the experimenter in the space-time region R freely chooses and performs experiment R2 and gets the outcome R2+, then in any possible world W ′ that is the same as world W except for the possible consequences of choosing in the region R the experiment R1, instead of whatever was chosen in W (namely R2), the outcome in R is R1−.
In reference [2] I justified each step in the proof that statement (1) is true and statement (2) is false by using the machinery of David Lewis's rules of reasoning with counterfactual statements. The Lewis machinery is reasonable and orthodox, but was created in the climate where the ideas of deterministic classical physics prevailed, and in the end it is merely a set of conventions designed to cope in a deterministic setting with the idea that something other than what actually happens 'could have happened'. The conventions are designed to mesh with our intuitions about the proper use of contrary-tofact statements, but there are other contending rules, and the whole situation is somewhat controversial. But as I have emphasized, and Shimony and Stein have agreed, the quantum situation permits a more direct approach, which avoids leaning on the basically conventional features of the classical approach. Instead, one can exploit the fact the concept of a 'free choice' is compatible with quantum theory, due to its basically indeterministic character. This allows one to stay with ordinary logic plus a natural specified meaning for the needed counterfactual assertion.
In order to have a common ground for dealing with the concerns of Shimony and Stein I shall, in this paper, adopt this alternative approach, which is strictly line with quantum thinking, rather than relying on Lewis's classical rules. However, apart from this technical change, I shall adhere to the logical form of the argument that I used in reference [2] . In particular, I shall retain the following natural meaning of the statement (E2 → O):
is, by definition, true in a possible world W if and only if outcome O occurs in any possible world W ′ that is the same as world W except for the possible consequences of freely choosing and performing experiment E instead of the alternative experiment freely chosen and performed in W . The set of possible worlds is limited by the specified conditions A, B, and C.
To use this definition one must limit "the possible consequences of ..." This is always done by using LOC1. Since this definition is toothless without this condition LOC1, or some such condition, and since LOC1 is used only in connection with this definiion, it is not unreasonable to incorporate LOC1 into the definition of the counterfactual statement. Shimony and Stein have done essentially that. However, they did not do exactly that. My condition LOC1 excludes from the effects of changing a free choice only effects on outcomes that have already appeared earlier, in the special Lorentz frame LF. But Shimony and Stein exclude all effects that lie outside the forward light-cone of the region in which the change in the free choice occurs.
I use the weaker assumption LOC1 because the truth of LOC1 is certainly compatible with the principles of relativistic quantum field theory, and is in fact entailed by them, whereas the stronger form used by Shimony and Stein is incompatible those principles. It is much clearer to argue directly from assumptions that are true, in the sense of being consequences of orthodox quantum theory, rather that making an assumption that is incompatible with relativistic quantum theory.
The fact that LOC1 is entailed in orthodox relativistic quantum field theory is proved by noting that the possibility of defining one such frame LF follows from the Tomonaga-Schwinger [6, 7] formulation of relativistic quantum field theory, in which advancing space-like surfaces are the analogs of the advancing constant-time surfaces of the non-relativistic formulation of von Neumann [8] . Of course, an infinitude of alternative possible choices for LF can be found: any frame will do. But the required property follows for only one frame or another, not for any two or more together.
With the stage thus set, I can turn to the central question of whether the conjunction of the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2) can be reconciled, as Shimony and Stein appear to suggest, with the idea that no information about the choice made in region L can get to region R, which is situated spacelike relative to L.
To see the apparent conflict one can consider the consequence of the fact that (1) is true and (2) is false in the context of the orthodox idea that "nature chooses the outcome" of the experiment chosen by the experimenter. In this context the consequence of the truth of (1) and falsity of (2) is that SR asserts the existence of a definite theoretical connection between the outcomes that nature delivers under the two alternative possible conditions, and that this theoretically necessary condition on what nature can do in R depends nontrivially on which experiment is freely chosen and performed by the experimenter in L.
But how can any theoretical model-hidden-variable or not-fulfill conditions on Nature's choices in region R that depend nontrivially on which free choice is made in L if no information about this choice made in L can be present in R?
This apparent result, that any theoretical model that conforms to the conditions A, B, and C must accomodate transfers of information over a spacelike intervals, does not conflict with the requirements of the theory of relativity, in the context of quantum theory: it conflicts only with a certain prejudice generated by uncritically extending to indeterministic quantum theory a feature of its deterministic classical approximation. This prejudice has, in fact, been the barrier that has blocked for many years the creation of a satisfactory realistic formulation of relativistic quantum theory. In a quantum context the Lorentz requirements of relativity theory pertain exclusively to relationships among observables, not to the reality that lies behind the phenomena. Thus the obvious realistic, relativistic quantum theory is just relativistic quantum field theory with a preferred sequence of advancing Tomonaga-Schwinger [6, 7] spacelike surfaces defining the successive instants "now".
This entails, of course, a reversion to the pre-relativity Newtonian idea of an absolute time, or something similar to it, at the underlying ontological level. But the founders of quantum theory strongly stressed the fact that this theory, as they conceived it, was only about relationships between observations, not about properties of the underlying reality. The TomonageSchwinger theory maintains all the observable requirements of the theory of relativity, no matter how the preferred sequence of advancing spacelike surfaces is chosen. Hence the only thing actually blocking acceptance of this theory as the relativistic quantum theory of reality is the prejudicial assumption that the reality itself, like the connections between observations, can have no transfer of information over spacelike intervals. But the fact that this condition can be maintained in the deterministic classical limit, where the entire history of the universe is determined by the initial conditions, and can immediately be laid out on a space-time background, with no free choices allowed, does not entail that it can be maintained in the full indeterministic theory with free choices allowed.
The analysis of the Hardy case supports the view that the reality behind the indeterministic quantum rules cannot maintain this constraint. That observation immediately elevates John von Neumann's [8] formulation of quantum theory, applied to Tomonaga-Schwinger relativistic quantum field theory, to prime candidacy as the paradigm relativistic quantum theory of reality.
Shimony and Stein allege that this apparent result-that the information about whether L1 or L2 was freely chosen and performed in region L must be available in region R of-is incorrect. They base their argument on the assertion that the semantical truth conditions for the counterfactual in question refer explicitly to the entire exterior of the extended future light-cone of R.
That claim about the entire exterior is not exactly true in my version of the proof. The statement SR combine with LOC1 says: SR-LOC1: "If in the possible world W the experiment R2 is freely chosen and performed in R and the outcome there is R2+ then if W ′ is a possible world that is the same as W in L, but in which R1 is freely chosen and performed in R, instead of R2, the outcome in R in world W ′ is R1−. In spite of the difference between the light-cone version of the causality condition used by Shimony and Stein and the condition LOC1 used by me, this combined statement SR-LOC1 exhibits the feature pointed to by Shimony and Stein: a reference to the region L, which lies outside the forward light cone of the region R. It is this implicit reference of SR to L that Shimony and Stein are concerned about. The question is whether this reference to L upsets my essential claim that the conjunction of the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2) requires the information about whether L1 or L2 is performed in L to be present in R.
Let me begin my answer by explaining the question in more detail. The statement SR involves the words "instead of". We have a clear idea of what we mean here by "instead of". In the real situation the experimenter in R makes the choice R2. But we have assumed that, just at the moment of choosing, the other choice R1 could have popped out instead of R2. But the central idea is that everything prior to that moment of choosing is exactly what it is in the actual world: there is just one evolving quantum world, which could go either way at the moment of choice. This condition of sameness prior to the moment of choice is the condition that limits the changes permitted by the phrase "except for the possible consequences of the change in the free choice": no possible consequence of a changed choice can lie earlier than the moment of choice.
The point raised by Shimony and Stein, as applied to my argument, is that this implicit reference to the (unchanged) state of affairs (in L) prior to the moment of the choice between R1 and R2 is an essential element of the very idea of "instead of" that appears in the statement SR. Hence there is in SR an essential implicit reference to region L, even though all the symbols explicitly appearing in SR pertain to possible events in R.
Their concern about this implicit reference to L stems from the fact that in my 1997 paper I based my argument-for the claim that the conjunction of the truth of (1) and falsity of (2) entails a violation of the idea that "observable effects can propagate only into the future (light-cone)"-on the fact that "everything mentioned in SR is an observable phenomenon in region R." Their concern is that the essential implicit reference of SR to the region L might upset my argument.
This essential implicit reference of SR to L does not affect my argument. To understand why it does not, one must note that the steps in a logical argument are like a series of black boxes, each of which displays explicitly only certain of the variables of the system. These explicitly displayed variables are like inputs and outputs: certain connection between these variables are exhibited, but the reasons why these connections hold are not shown. However, all of the relevant effects pertaining to the inner workings must be controlled by the displayed variables.
In the statement (1), L2 ⇒ [(R2 ∧ R2+) → (R12 → R1−)], the only displayed variables are L2, R2, R2+, R1, and R1−. The input conditions are L2, R2, R2+, and R1, and the output is R1−. The statement asserts that if the input variables L2, R2, R2+, and R1 are put into a certain logical expression, the output must be R1−, never R1+, But the falseness of (2) says that if the inputs are changed only by changing L2 to L1, then the output is no longer restricted to R1−: it is now allowed to be R1+. So changing the input variable from L2 to L1 has affected the output variable R1 + /R1−. There can be all sorts of dependence on all sorts of inner variables, but whatever these dependences are they must, to the extent that they are relevant to the output conclusion, be controlled by the input variables, if the statement is indeed logically correct. So, in this case at hand, changing the input variable L1/L2 affects nontrivially the output variable R1 + /R1−. But then the information about whether L1 or L2 is chosen in L must get to the region R where the value of the output variable R1+/R1− is displayed.
